Abstract
In late 2012, Sri Lanka public
discourse celebrated a “first national satellite,” branded locally as SupremeSAT-I.
Technical registries and international reporting identify the spacecraft as ChinaSat-12,
built by Thales Alenia Space on the Spacebus-4000C2 platform and
launched by China’s Long March-3B/E from Xichang, with transponder
capacity leased/co-branded by Sri Lanka’s private firm SupremeSAT (Pvt)
Ltd—not a domestically built or sovereignly owned GEO satellite. The
project later became politically charged due to public claims around Rohitha
Rajapaksa’s role and recurring questions about financing, filings, and
operational status. In August 2025, parliamentary statements and
counter-statements revived the controversy. This paper reconstructs the
technical reality, corporate arrangements, and political narrative using
verifiable sources and presents an evidence-based assessment. Reuters Sunday Times
1. Introduction
Small states often pursue
space-adjacent prestige via leasing or co-branding capacity on foreign
communications satellites rather than funding sovereign spacecraft. That
approach—common in commercial satcom—can be misinterpreted in domestic
political narratives as “owning a satellite.” Sri Lanka’s SupremeSAT
case is emblematic: the branding of leased GEO capacity as “SupremeSAT-I”
coincided with celebratory rhetoric in 2012. We ask: What exactly flew; who
owned what; how was it represented; and where does the project stand today?
We anchor answers in technical catalogs and contemporaneous reporting and then
connect them to later political claims. NSSDCA
2. Methods (Source Evaluation
Protocol)
- Primary technical catalogs (NASA NSSDCA;
Gunter’s Space Page) to confirm spacecraft identity, bus, and orbital
history. NSSDCASkyrocket Space
- International newswires (Reuters) for
contemporaneous, externally edited reporting of launch facts and quoted
officials. Reuters+1
- Sri Lankan outlets (Sunday Times, Daily
Mirror, The Island, NewsFirst, Ada Derana, Sri Lanka Mirror)
for political and parliamentary context. When multiple outlets reported
the same claim, we cross-checked for consistency (dates, quotes, BOI
references). The Sunday TimesDaily MirrorThe IslandNewsfirstSri Lanka Mirror
- Corporate/industry materials (ChinaSat
operator pages and technical briefs curated by satcom brokers) to
corroborate orbital slot and platform details. Skybrokers
- Records of inquiries (2017 FCID questioning)
via reputable blogs and local news for the project’s governance trail. DBS JeyarajAda Derana
We privilege date-stamped,
reputationally strong sources and treat political assertions as
claims unless accompanied by documentary evidence (audited accounts, BOI
filings, operator contracts).
3. Background: What Launched
on 27 Nov 2012?
ChinaSat-12 (COSPAR 2012-067A;
SATCAT 39017) launched on Long March-3B/E from Xichang,
manufactured by Thales Alenia Space (Spacebus-4000C2).
Post-launch testing occurred near 51.5°E, then the spacecraft operated
at ~87.5°E. International reporting at the time stated Sri Lanka’s SupremeSAT
partnered with China Great Wall Industry Corp. (CGWIC); Sri Lankan
officials emphasized it was a private venture. Reuters
The Sunday Times clarified
domestically that the celebrated “Sri Lankan satellite” was actually ChinaSat-12
with Sri Lankan-leased payload capacity—i.e., co-branding rather
than sovereign ownership. The Sunday Times
Technical confirmation
Independent catalogs list the
spacecraft as ChinaSat-12 (later referenced as ZX-12/ZX-15A in fleet
planning), with note that part of the payload was leased to Sri Lanka and
co-branded as “SupremeSat-1.” Skyrocket Space
4. Corporate Structure, BOI
Status, and Public Claims (2012–2015)
SupremeSAT publicized BOI-linked
investment commitments and plans (e.g., a Kandy ground station/“Space
Academy”). International and local reporting consistently describe a capacity
lease/partnership rather than a domestically built GEO platform or a Sri
Lankan-filed orbital slot. In December 2012, Sri Lanka’s Telecommunications
& IT Minister told Parliament that no government funds
were invested and no Sri Lankan orbital slot was used for the project. The Sunday Times
Reuters likewise framed
the launch as a private SupremeSAT–CGWIC effort, with domestic media
crediting Rohitha Rajapaksa in a public-facing role. Reuters
5. Political Narrative and
Oversight
The mix of co-branding and
celebratory messaging produced a durable public misperception that Sri
Lanka had launched a sovereign national satellite in 2012. In 2017, Rohitha
Rajapaksa confirmed to media he was questioned by the FCID about the
project’s finances, remarking “Sri Lanka did not spend a cent for this
project.” DBS Jeyaraj
6. 2025 Re-Ignition:
Parliamentary Statements and Disputes
Debate resurfaced in August
2025 when the Prime Minister told Parliament that no government
funds were used and that income had been received over time (as per
BOI data). Within a day, the Trade Minister publicly contradicted
key figures, calling for investigations and citing data errors (e.g.,
decimal misplacement) and filing gaps—triggering cross-bench concerns
about the credibility of parliamentary answers. Multiple outlets
documented the contradiction and the push for probes. NewsfirstLatest in the News Sphere | The MorningThe IslandDaily Mirror
Some political rhetoric claimed
the satellite “cannot be traced” in international registries; however, ChinaSat-12’s
identity, launch, and orbital history are recorded in global catalogs (NASA
NSSDCA; industry compendia). The company and supportive outlets
reiterated the 87.5°E operational context in responses. These latter
claims should be read as co-branded capacity on ChinaSat-12 (and
successor fleet planning), not as proof of a Sri Lankan-registered
spacecraft. NSSDCASkyrocket SpaceNewswire
7. Technical Verification:
Catalogs vs. Domestic Branding
- Spacecraft identity: ChinaSat-12, Spacebus-4000C2,
Thales Alenia Space. Not a Sri Lankan-manufactured GEO
satellite. Wikipedia
- Launch and orbit: 27 Nov 2012, LM-3B/E
from Xichang; service at ~87.5°E.
- Commercial model: Leased/co-branded
payload capacity marketed as “SupremeSAT-I.” The Sunday TimesSkyrocket Space
Key inference: In
technical literature, spacecraft are cataloged by their
manufacturer/operator. Leasing transponders does not rename
the spacecraft in canonical registries. Hence, ChinaSat-12 remains the
spacecraft of record even if Sri Lankan commercial services were
marketed under “SupremeSAT-I.” (Industry practice, corroborated by the
catalogs cited.)
8. Comparative Frame:
Sovereign GEO vs. Leased/Co-Branded Capacity
|
Dimension |
Sovereign GEO (e.g., own build/ownership) |
Leased/Co-Branded Capacity (SupremeSAT case) |
|
Spacecraft registration/name |
Registered to national/operator; spacecraft name reflects owner |
Remains the manufacturer/operator’s spacecraft name (here, ChinaSat-12) |
|
Capital outlay |
Very high (build, insure, launch) |
Lower; pay for transponder capacity/long-term lease |
|
Orbital slot filing |
National filing via ITU, coordination, enforcement |
Uses lessor’s existing slot/rights |
|
Ground segment |
Typically includes national control/TT&C, gateways |
May include local gateways/VSAT POPs; TT&C remains with primary
operator |
|
Public perception risk |
Clear national asset |
High risk of confusion if branded as “national satellite” |
|
Documentary evidence |
Procurement, ITU filings, operator contracts |
Capacity lease agreements, BOI filings, service contracts |
SupremeSAT aligns with the
right-hand column. The Sunday Times+1
9. Distinct Case: “Raavana-1”
(2019)
Public discussion sometimes
conflates SupremeSAT with Raavana-1, a Sri Lankan university-led
CubeSat inserted via an international smallsat program in 2019. This
was LEO and educational/tech-demo in character—not a GEO
communications platform—hence institutionally and technically distinct
from SupremeSAT’s leasing model. ORF Online
10. Discussion
Evidence convergence—Reuters
wires, Sunday Times clarifications, NASA/Gunter catalogs—supports the
interpretation that Sri Lanka did not place a sovereignly owned GEO
communications satellite into orbit in 2012; rather, a commercial
co-branding of leased ChinaSat-12 capacity occurred. ReutersThe Sunday TimesNSSDCASkyrocket Space
Why confusion persisted.
Domestically, the term “first Sri Lankan satellite” blurred branding vs.
ownership. Absent proactive technical communication, co-branding was read
by audiences as sovereign possession. That ambiguity later politicized
the project, especially given a high-profile political family member’s
involvement. Reuters
2025 claims require
documentary reconciliation. The Prime Minister’s statement (“no government
funds; income received”) and the Trade Minister’s rebuttal (“figures wrong;
investigation warranted”) cannot both stand without documentary
reconciliation (BOI submissions, audited financials, lease/royalty
schedules, corporate filings). Newspapers document the contradiction but are
not themselves audits; production of primary documents is the decisive
next step. Latest in the News Sphere | The MorningDaily Mirror
11. Conclusions
- What flew (2012): ChinaSat-12, built
by Thales Alenia Space, launched by China, with Sri
Lankan-marketed capacity branded “SupremeSAT-I.” This is not
a sovereign Sri Lankan GEO satellite in technical registries. The Sunday Times
- Who paid/owned: Evidence supports a private,
capacity-leasing model with no direct GoSL capital outlay (per
2012 ministerial statement; 2025 PM restatement). Whether national income
figures cited in 2025 were accurate remains contested pending
documents. The Sunday TimesLatest in the News Sphere | The Morning
- Where it is: Catalogs and industry notes
support the 87.5°E operational association for ChinaSat-12;
subsequent fleet renaming/repositioning planning is recorded in specialist
sources. Sri Lankan statements claiming “it remains at 87.5°E” should be
read as commercial service location claims tied to the Chinese
spacecraft, not as proof of a Sri Lankan-registered satellite. Skyrocket Space
12. Recommendations for
Further Verification
- Obtain and publish: (a) BOI approvals
& amendments; (b) audited accounts (2012–2024); (c) capacity
lease contracts (terms, duration, sub-lease rights, royalty/fee
schedules); (d) ground segment licenses; (e) any royalty
remittances to GoSL and bank receipts.
- Request operator confirmation from China
Satellite Communications/CGWIC on: capacity blocks leased to
SupremeSAT; service start/stop dates; and current status.
- Commission an independent technical note
mapping ChinaSat-12/ZX-12 fleet movements (2012–2025) against
claimed service footprints. (This is straightforward with public TLEs and
operator notices.) Skybrokers
Appendices
Appendix A — Timeline (Key
Milestones)
- 27 Nov 2012: ChinaSat-12 launched
(LM-3B/E), Spacebus-4000C2; press frames Sri Lanka participation as
private SupremeSAT–CGWIC venture. Reuters
- 2 Dec 2012: Sunday Times: “It’s
ChinaSat-12 with a Lankan payload.” The Sunday Times
- 9 Dec 2012: Minister to Parliament: no
GoSL funds; no Sri Lankan orbital slot used. The Sunday Times
- Aug 2017: Rohitha Rajapaksa
questioned by FCID; says no GoSL funds were spent. DBS Jeyaraj
- Aug 2025: PM says no GoSL funds; income
received (BOI data). Trade Minister contradicts figures;
investigation sought; media debate reignites. Latest in the News Sphere | The MorningDaily Mirror
Appendix B — Technical
Snapshot (ChinaSat-12)
- Bus: Spacebus-4000C2; Manufacturer:
Thales Alenia Space; Launch: 27 Nov 2012 (LM-3B/E, Xichang); Orbit:
GEO; Longitudes: test near 51.5°E; operations ~87.5°E; Payload:
C/Ku-band; Notes: payload capacity leased and co-branded SupremeSAT-I
for Sri Lankan services. Skyrocket Space
References (selected, by type)
Technical catalogs /
manufacturer & operator references
- NASA NSSDCA: ChinaSat-12 (2012-067A)
spacecraft record. (Launch, platform context; ITAR-free variant.) NSSDCA
- Gunter’s Space Page: “ZX-12 (ChinaSat-12,
SupremeSat-1) → ZX-15A.” (Lease/co-branding note; fleet movements.) Skyrocket Space
- ChinaSat technical brief (compiled resource
with operator data: bus, slot, launch date). Skybrokers
Contemporaneous international
& Sri Lankan reporting (2012)
- Reuters: “China launches Sri Lanka’s first
satellite as India watches ties grow,” 27 Nov 2012. (Private venture;
SupremeSAT/CGWIC; domestic credit to Rohitha.) Reuters
- Sunday Times (SL): “It’s ChinaSat-12 with a
Lankan payload,” 2 Dec 2012. (Clarifies payload leasing/co-branding.) The Sunday Times
- Sunday Times (SL): “SL Govt. hasn’t invested
in Supreme SAT,” 9 Dec 2012. (Parliament statement: no GoSL funds; no Sri
Lankan orbital slot used.) The Sunday Times
Governance / inquiry
- DBS Jeyaraj: “Rohitha Rajapaksa Questioned
by FCID…,” 16 Aug 2017 (post-statement media quote). DBS Jeyaraj
- Ada Derana: “Rohitha Rajapaksa grilled at
FCID,” 15 Aug 2017. Ada Derana
Renewed debate (Aug 2025)
- NewsFirst: “PM breaks silence on SupremeSAT:
No Govt funds; millions in revenue,” 7 Aug 2025. Newsfirst
- The Morning: “Supreme SAT: ‘Income
received’: PM,” 8 Aug 2025. Latest in the News Sphere | The Morning
- Daily Mirror: “Credibility of govt’s
answers… compromised – Opposition,” 9 Aug 2025; “Minister Nalinda weighs
in…,” 9 Aug 2025. Daily Mirror+1
- The Island: “Samarasinghe disputes PM’s
response…,” 8 Aug 2025. The Island
- Sri Lanka Mirror: “SupremeSAT welcomes
‘long-awaited public acknowledgment’,” 8–9 Aug 2025. Sri Lanka Mirror
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